Theoretical explication of a growing body of empirical data on consciousness-related anomalous phenomena is unlikely to be achieved in terms of known physical processes. Rather, it will first be necessary to formulate the basic role of consciousness in the definition of reality before such anomalous experience can adequately be represented. This paper takes the position that reality is constituted only in the interaction of consciousness with its environment, and therefore that any scheme of conceptual organization developed to represent that reality (...) must reflect the processes of consciousness as well as those of its environment. In this spirit, the concepts and formalisms of elementary quantum mechanics, as originally proposed to explain anomalous atomic-scale physical phenomena, are appropriated via metaphor to represent the general characteristics of consciousness interacting with any environment. More specifically, if consciousness is represented by a quantum mechanical wave function, and its environment by an appropriate potential profile, Schrödinger wave mechanics defines eigenfunctions and eigenvalues that can be associated with the cognitive and emotional experiences of that consciousness in that environment. To articulate this metaphor it is necessary to associate certain aspects of the formalism, such as the coordinate system, the quantum numbers, and even the metric itself, with various impressionistic descriptors of consciousness, such as its intensity, perspective, approach/avoidance attitude, balance between cognitive and emotional activity, and receptive/assertive disposition. With these established, a number of the generic features of quantum mechanics, such as the wave/particle duality, and the uncertainty, indistinguishability, and exclusion principles, display metaphoric relevance to familiar individual and collective experiences. Similarly, such traditional quantum theoretic exercises as the central force field and atomic structure, covalent molecular bonds, barrier penetration, and quantum statistical collective behavior become useful analogies for representation of a variety of consciousness experiences, both normal and anomalous, and for the design of experiments to study these systematically. (shrink)

The scientific, personal, and social implications of this revolutionary work are staggering. MARGINS OF REALITY is nothing less than a fundamental reevaluation of how the world really works.

Male and female participants were instructed to produce an altered response pattern on an Implicit Association Test measure of gender identity by slowing performance in trials requiring the same response to stimuli designating own gender and self. Participants’ faking success was found to be predictable by a measure of slowing relative to unfaked performances. This combined task slowing (CTS) indicator was then applied in reanalyses of three experiments from other laboratories, two involving instructed faking and one involving possibly motivated faking. (...) Across all studies involving instructed faking, CTS correctly classified 75% of intentionally faking participants. Using the CTS index to adjust faked Implicit Association Test scores increased the correlation of CTS-adjusted measures with known group membership, relative to unadjusted (i.e., faked) measures. (shrink)

Husserl and Contemporary Thought contains twelve essays that address certain key themes in Husserl's thought, each in some way confronting issues critical to the Husserlian project. The essays first appeared in the 1982 volume of Research in Phenornenology. The "contemporary thought" in the title should be understood in a limited sense as refer- ring to certain strains of thinking pursued in the present decade, build- ing however on past research. The volume shows several directions in which contemporary thinkers are taking (...) Husserlian phenomenology. The most common direction is through an evaluative contrast between Husserl's vision and the ideas of other philosophers, some of whom listened to Husserl but went their own ways. The second direction taken is represented in a series of current works by active phenomenol- ogists. Some of these essays - and here we have the greatest concentra- tion on a single theme - expand upon Husserl's analyses concerning the temporality of human experience. Other essays take up the threads of long-standing debates among Husserl scholars. I will treat each group of essays - on other philosophers, on time, and on topics other than time in turn, although the essays do not follow this order in the volume. (shrink)

If the world itself is metaphysically indeterminate in a specified respect, what follows? In this paper, we develop a theory of metaphysical indeterminacy answering this question.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 149 temporary, might he an eyeopener to young Thomists who know so little about his work. In the meantime, however, in this English version of The Eyes of Faith a primary source of first importance has come our way. Catholic libraries should definitely have it on hand for philosophers and theologians to consult. Fordham University Bronx, New York GERALD A. McCooL, S.J. The Phuosophy of Thomas Aquinas: (...) Introductory Readings. Edited by CHRISTOPHER MARTIN. New York: Routledge, Chapman & Hall, 1988. Pp. 202. $57.50 (cloth); $18.95 (paper). One has a difficult time finding a wholly satisfactory collection of writings from Thomas Aquinas in a single volume. In different ways, the well-known collections of Mary Clark, Robert Goodwin, Thomas Gilby, Vernon Bourke, and Anton Pegis have their merits, hut they have their defects too-one of which is that they all came out twenty to forty years ago. Christopher Martin has recently produced a new collection of readings, and his selection is much different. Add to this that many of the texts in his work are rare or nonexistent in translation, and one begins to see why it is delightful to see this work appear. Christopher Martin has gathered a number of philosophical texts from Aquinas for those who have already cut their teeth in philosophy. (Hence, the uninitiated to philosophy will find things here hard going.) Texts were selected principally with an eye to interesting those students who are most familiar with philosophy in the analytic tradition. They are often unacquainted with theology and at a loss as to how to sort out Thomas's philosophical claims from his theological claims. The aim was to produce a volume which would help such students read Thomas fruitfully and show them that Thomas has many genuine philosophical insights. To this end, texts were chosen that presupposed no, or a minimal, understanding of theology. Not every side of Thomas's philosophical thought is reflected in this work, hut a number of important sides of it are, and an idea of the breadth of it comes through. The format of this work is something like that of Ralph Mclnerny's recent A First Glance at St. Thomas Aquinas. Each chapter begins with an essay that is closely tied to a Thomistic text or two given at the end of the chapter. In Martin's work, however, the emphasis lies more on the itexts than on the expository essays. Apart from the introduction, the 150 BOOK REVIEWS book is divided into five chapters: Aquinas on Logic; Aquinas on Metaphysics; Aquinas on God; Aquinas on Truth, Knowledge and the Mind; and Aquinas on Ethics. The chapters by design follow the major divisions and order of Anthony Kenny's Aquinas: A Collection of Critical Essays. The essays which begin each chapter and introduce the texts that follow are solid pieces. They make many references to Thomas's depend· ence on Aristotle and to parallels between Thomas's handling of a problem and recent discussions of the same. They also give guidance in reading the Thomistic texts and explain what is difficult in the doctrine found in the texts. Throughout these essays, the influence of Peter Geach's writings is evident (especially God and the Soul and Three Philosophers). At times it is just an example or the choice of a term, and at other times it is something more substantial. Though Martin's essays are quite accurate and helpful, a reader can find things to quibble with. Thomas's distinction, for example, between id a quo nomen imponitur ad significandum and id ad quod nomen imponitur ad significandum does not seem, as Martin suggests, to be Frege's distinction between sense and reference or Kripke's distinction between the reference of a name and the fixing of a reference. Rather, Thomas seems to be distinguishing more the etymology of a name from its meaning. Again, it will not do to say that the principle of individuation for individuals of the same kind is " distinct lumps of matter " and that the lumpiness of matter in turn is responsible for the individuation of forms. The " lumpiness " of matter is itself a formal feature. Thomas's teaching... (shrink)

This is a very positive review of Carlson, Allen, and Arnold Berleant, ed. 2004. The Aesthetics of Natural Environments. Broadview Press. -/- .

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Peacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis ed. by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, Gerard F. PowersJames W. McCarty IIIPeacebuilding: Catholic Theology, Ethics, and Praxis Edited by Robert J. Schreiter, R. Scott Appleby, and Gerard F. Powers Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 2010. 480pp. $27.00Peacebuilding results from a four-year research project sponsored by the Catholic Peacebuilding Network. A wide-ranging and interdisciplinary set of fifteen essays, Peacebuilding not (...) only brings to the fore the unique ways that Roman Catholic theology and practice has contributed to the global work of peacebuilding, but it also makes the case that the Catholic Church needs to develop a more robust theology of peacebuilding to complement and strengthen traditional Catholic approaches to the ethics of war and peace. The two most bold proposals along these lines are Daniel Philpott’s call for a papal encyclical on peacebuilding (92, 120) and Maryann Cusimano Love’s proposal of “just peace” criteria for guiding peacebuilding work in a fashion similar to the way “just war” criteria have guided the conduct of war (82, 425–27).Peacebuilding is organized into two main sections. The first documents and theorizes the work of Catholic actors and organizations in peacebuilding work. In one of the most helpful essays in this section, John Paul Lederach describes how the “ubiquitous presence” of the Catholic Church in a society is, in fact, one of the most unique contributions the Church has to make to global peacebuilding. Lederach uses the phrase “ubiquitous presence” to describe the unique role Catholic “actors” play within the “pyramid approach” to peacebuilding that he develops elsewhere (see Lederach, The Moral Imagination: The Art and Soul of Peacebuilding [New York: Oxford University Press, 2005], 79). Because of its hierarchical structure, the Catholic Church—especially in Catholic-majority countries—has the potential to cultivate peacebuilding allies among different sectors of a society: the elite, “midlevel” actors, and at the grassroots level. Many other peacebuilding actors—politicians, civil society activists, and the historic peace churches, for instance—do not have such a ubiquitous presence. While Lederach has previously emphasized the importance of midlevel actors in peacebuilding, in this essay he argues that the “ubiquitous presence” of the Catholic Church [End Page 213] in a society provides a basis for making connections for peacebuilding work among a range of sectors within a society. Several of the other contributors to this book draw on this observation and demonstrate its usefulness to a variety of settings. In my estimation, this is the most important contribution of the volume.The second section consists of six essays that both expand upon existing Catholic moral theology and make the case that Catholic theology needs to develop a more robust theology of peacebuilding. Here we find a range of arguments—from Robert Schreiter’s proposal for a practical theology of reconciliation and Peter Phan’s outline of a fourfold Catholic understanding of interreligious dialogue to Kenneth Himes’s discussion of the ways peacebuilding theory challenges and complements contemporary Catholic social teaching. Himes, in particular, claims that the current acceptance of a Catholic “presumption against war” requires a more robust Catholic approach to conflict transformation; in making his case, he draws on resonances between contemporary peacebuilding theory and recent reflections on jus post bellum (justice after war) as a new category of just war thinking.As in nearly every edited collection, the quality of the essays in Peacebuilding varies. I found the essays in the first section to be the most stimulating. Not only do they highlight the peacebuilding work the Catholic Church is currently doing around the world, they also ground their proposals for how we should understand and do peacebuilding from a Catholic perspective in relevant historical examples.Indeed, the varied nature of the essays in Peacebuilding is precisely what makes it a valuable resource for both researchers and teachers of peacebuilding. On the one hand, it includes essays that break new ground and move forward our understanding of the unique nature of Catholic peacebuilding. On the other, it includes essays that introduce the topic of peacebuilding to students of religion and ethics. This book, then, serves as an excellent resource for a range... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:526 BOOK REVIEWS learned how to integrate satisfaction into love (91, 113, 119, 124, 136, 186, 192, 198; cp. 37). Indeed, it is Aquinas's gradual integration of satisfaction as a motive for the Incarnation subordinate to love (166) that enables Aquinas aptly to locate satisfaction within the Christian life (cp. 47, 136, 142, 166) and accounts for Cessario's subtitle. Third, I am not clear on Ccssario's (or my own!) (...) stand on how we ought sort out the respects in which Thomas's and our perspectives merge (cp. xiv). In his conclusion Cessario is cautious, suggesting that "if the term ' satisfaction ' cannot be restored to current usage, then certainly the substance of Saint Thomas's understanding of satisfaction can and should be." (256). But, given Cessario's own persuasive display of the way satisfactio pervades the very texture of Aquinas's theology, I am not sure we can have the "substance" without the term-or vice-versa. Clearly Cessario thinks the merging is substantive. But he himself teaches us that supporting this claim involves supporting claims for exegetical, liturgical ecclesial, and other practices. Those of us who think that satisfactio is a description rather than "the guiding model or key notion" (xx, my emphasis) for thinking Christ crucified will need to see such support worked out in relation to the competing sotcriologies Cessario mentions (267) as well as ecumenical discussions of justification which were understandably outside the scope of this book (151). But a single book can only accomplish a single thing-and this book clearly succeeds in showing us how Thomas can be brought to bear on contemporary theological issues. All students of Aquinas and/or soteriology ought to read this text. Loyola College in Maryland Baltimore, Maryland JAMES J. BUCKLEY How We Know. Edited by MICHAEr, SHAFTO. San 1!1rancisco: Harper & Row. 1985. Pp. xv and 171. $14.95. How We Know is a collection of six papers delivered in 1984 at the twentieth Nobel Conference, held at Gustavus Adolphus College in St. Peter, Minnesota. Two words that came to my mind as I worked through the papers were "fascinating" and "frightening". The Conference dealt with cognitive science and a number of the authors have come up with interesting, provocative, and often orig'inal observations about how the human mind operates when it hies to remember and to understand. In his Introduction Michael Shafto, who is a Scientific Officer in the Personnel and Training Research Programs of the United States Office of Naval Research, notes that cognitive science as the work of a coalition of thinkers is barely a decade old, and he reminds the reader that the methods BOOK REVIEWS 59.7 of cognitive science are those of experimental psychology, physiology, and computer science. Though the Confermce was supposedly aimed at nonspecialists, the reader unfamiliar with cognitive science might find some of the papers a bit difficult. Certainly the backgrounds of the authors are very impressive. The first four papers in the collection are by Gerald Edelman, Brenda Milner, Roger C. Schank, and Herbert A. Simon respectively. Edelman is the Director and Scientific Chairman of the Neurosciences Research Program at Rockefeller University; Milner is Professor of Psychology in the Department of Neurology at McGill University: Schank is Professor and Chairman of the Computer Science Department at Yale; and Simon is Professor of Computer Science and Psychology at Carnegie-Mellon University. Calling his theory of the hum:m brain "Neural Darwinism," Edelman claims that the brain is Darwinian. Taking Darwin's theory of natural selections and applying it to the brain, Edelman argues that during ontogeny and behavior those groups of neurons are chosen that are adaptive for the organism. Milner explores the neurophysiological basis of that special moment when a new experience affects the brain. Insisting that memory is not merely a passive reproi!ucer but rather actively selective, Milner, relying on her studies of patients. with loss of memory, suggests that the frontal lobes of the brain hnve a special role in memory. Interested in the interface of mcmory anil percr-ption, Schank notes that, because human memory is dynamic and the memory of the computer is not, the -programming of the intelligent functions of... (shrink)

There is a contradiction in our ideas about moral responsibility. In one strand of our thinking, we believe that a person can become more blameworthy by luck. Consider some examples in order to make that idea concrete. Two reckless drivers manage their vehicles in the same way, and one but not the other kills a pedestrian. Two corrupt judges would each freely take a bribe if one were offered. By luck of the courthouse draw, only one judge is offered a (...) bribe, and so only one takes a bribe. Luck is the salient difference between the agents in each case. After all, the spatial location of the pedestrian is outside of each driver’s control, and being offered a bribe is outside of each judge’s control. But we blame the killer driver more than the merely reckless driver, and we blame the bribe-taker more than the mere would-be bribe-taker. This is because we believe that the killer driver and the bribe-taker are more blameworthy than each of their counterparts. Nevertheless, the idea that luck affects moral responsibility contradicts another feature of our thinking captured in this moral principle: A person’s blameworthiness cannot be affected by that which is not within her control. This moral principle yields the verdict that the drivers are equally blameworthy and that the judges are equally blameworthy. So, to put the contradiction in concrete terms, our thinking about moral responsibility implies that the drivers are and are not equally blameworthy, and the same is true for the judges. -/- I argue that only the first strand of our thinking is correct. Certain kinds of luck in results, circumstances, and character can partially determine a person’s praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. In terms of the examples, I argue that the killer driver and the bribe-taker are more blameworthy than each of their counterparts. But if I am to make genuine progress in the moral luck debate, my arguments cannot appeal to case intuitions such as ‘the killer driver is more blameworthy,’ because the problem of moral luck is fundamentally a clash of intuitions. So, I offer arguments from diverse areas in philosophy in order to ensure that they do not bottom out in standard pro-moral luck intuitions. (shrink)

"All art should become science and all science art; poetry and philosophy should be made one." Friedrich Schlegel's words perfectly capture the project of the German Romantics, who believed that the aesthetic approaches of art and literature could reveal patterns and meaning in nature that couldn't be uncovered through rationalistic philosophy and science alone. In this wide-ranging work, Robert J. Richards shows how the Romantic conception of the world influenced (and was influenced by) both the lives of the people (...) who held it and the development of nineteenth-century science. Integrating Romantic literature, science, and philosophy with an intimate knowledge of the individuals involved—from Goethe and the brothers Schlegel to Humboldt and Friedrich and Caroline Schelling—Richards demonstrates how their tempestuous lives shaped their ideas as profoundly as their intellectual and cultural heritage. He focuses especially on how Romantic concepts of the self, as well as aesthetic and moral considerations—all tempered by personal relationships—altered scientific representations of nature. Although historians have long considered Romanticism at best a minor tributary to scientific thought, Richards moves it to the center of the main currents of nineteenth-century biology, culminating in the conception of nature that underlies Darwin's evolutionary theory. Uniting the personal and poetic aspects of philosophy and science in a way that the German Romantics themselves would have honored, The Romantic Conception of Life alters how we look at Romanticism and nineteenth-century biology. (shrink)